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STERN V. MARSHALL: THE EARTHQUAKE 
THAT HIT THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS AND 
THE AFTERSHOCKS THAT FOLLOWED 
Jolene Tanner* 
Stern v. Marshall is arguably the biggest decision to affect the 
bankruptcy courts in almost thirty years and has ramifications well 
beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court likely considered. Anna Nicole 
Smith, the appellant in the case, will be remembered not only for the 
imprint that she left on pop culture, but also for rattling an entire legal 
institution. This case wound its way through both state and federal 
judiciaries and twice reached our country’s highest court. The second 
time that it heard the case, the Court held that although bankruptcy 
courts, as Article I courts, could enter final judgments on certain state-
law counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), they could not 
constitutionally enter final judgments under Article III of the 
Constitution. While bankruptcy judges have created ways to 
temporarily address the conundrum that Stern created, potential long-
term effects of the ruling could be devastating to the way that 
bankruptcy courts operate. It may take years, or perhaps decades, to 
fully comprehend Stern’s impact on the federal judiciary. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision 
that rattled an entire judicial institution, calling into question the 
authority of bankruptcy courts. Stern v. Marshall1 is arguably the 
biggest decision to affect the bankruptcy courts in almost thirty 
years2 and has ramifications well beyond what the Court considered.3 
The Court’s holding in Stern caused judges, practitioners, scholars, 
and litigants4 to question bankruptcy judges’ authority and the 
sanctity of the bankruptcy courts. This decision sent shockwaves 
through the entire bankruptcy community. Key players in the 
 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). The Court held that bankruptcy judges cannot enter final 
judgments on state-law counterclaims by a debtor against a third-party claimant. Id. at 2620. 
 2. See, e.g., Med. Educ. & Health Servs. Inc. v. Indep. Municipality of Mayaguez (In re 
Med. Educ. & Health Servs. Inc.), 459 B.R. 527, 548–49 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011) (“[T]he [Stern] 
decision was as momentous a constitutional ruling on [the bankruptcy] courts’ authority as was 
the Justices’ decision in the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co. nullifying an earlier congressional law against those courts’ powers.” (citing N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion))); Event Notice, 
Fin. Lawyers Conference, Stern v. Marshall: Anna Nicole, Stripped of Legacy, Forces 
Bankruptcy System to Rerun Marathon (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.financial 
lawyers.org/2011mtgs.htm (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall [is] undoubtedly 
the most important bankruptcy decision in 29 years [and] . . . this ‘narrow’ holding is disrupting 
bankruptcy litigation around the country.”); Interview with Anne Wells, Associate Clinical 
Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch. L.A., in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 13, 2011) (“No [U.S. Supreme 
Court] decision, since Marathon, has challenged the authority of the bankruptcy courts in the way 
that Stern has.”); Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, Bankr. Judge, Cent. Dist. of Cal., 
in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 7, 2011) (explaining the hype surrounding this decision and that there are not 
many Supreme Court decisions on bankruptcy); Press Release, UCLA Sch. of Law, Professor 
Klee Publishes Emerging Issues Analysis on Stern v. Marshall (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/news-media/Pages/News.aspx?News 
ID=1868 (discussing Professor Kenneth Klee’s emerging issue analysis on Stern and stating that 
Stern is “the most important Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions in 29 years, which provides 
important restrictions on the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction”). Anne Wells has served as 
an editorial board member of the California Bankruptcy Journal for thirteen years, has published 
several bankruptcy articles, and teaches bankruptcy law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles. 
Interview with Anne Wells, supra. Judge Bluebond serves on the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Central District of California; she was appointed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in 2001. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra. 
 3. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will consider the constitutionality of 
magistrate judges’ ability to enter final judgments in certain matters. See infra Part IV.B. 
 4. For example, a Stern issue was raised before Judge Ahart. Interview with the Honorable 
Alan M. Ahart, Bankr. Judge, Cent. Dist. of Cal., in Woodland Hills, Cal. (Sept. 30, 2011). Judge 
Ahart serves on the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California; he was 
appointed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1988 and reappointed to a second 
fourteen-year term in 2002. Id. 
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bankruptcy community have been trying to decipher the case and its 
impact on bankruptcy courts, prompting several blog posts5 and 
circuit-wide seminars.6 Within a few months of the ruling, more than 
one hundred courts—including bankruptcy courts7 and district 
courts8 in every circuit, some circuit courts of appeals,9 and some 
state courts10—cited Stern in an attempt to understand the impact of 
 
 5. See, e.g., ANDREW GOTTFRIED, MORGAN LEWIS, STERN V. MARSHALL: NARROW 
HOLDING, BROADER IMPLICATIONS! 1 (2011), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/ 
RestructLF_Stern-v-Marshall_22july11.pdf (explaining that the Stern decision will likely result in 
future litigation over the issue of bankruptcy judges’ power and may limit their right to enter final 
judgments on certain issues). 
 6. For example, on September 9, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District 
of California in Los Angeles hosted a panel discussion for bankruptcy judges and practitioners 
regarding the impact of Stern. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. On 
October 6, 2011, the Financial Lawyers Conference hosted a panel discussion titled “Stern v. 
Marshall: Anna Nicole, Stripped of Legacy, Forces Bankruptcy System to Rerun Marathon,” to 
address the implications of Stern on the bankruptcy courts. Event Notice, Fin. Lawyers 
Conference, supra note 2. On October 7, 2011, the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
Commercial Law and Bankruptcy Section held a meeting entitled “The Meaning and Impact of 
Stern v. Marshall.” The Meaning and Impact of Stern v. Marshall, L.A. CNTY. BAR ASS’N 
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://onlinestore.lacba.org/calendar/#ViewCalendarEvent.cfm?1=1&Calendar 
EventID=3756. 
 7. For example, in response to Stern, a bankruptcy judge in the Seventh Circuit held that he 
may enter final judgments on five counterclaims that were filed against the claim of a secured 
creditor, where each of the counterclaims were either “necessarily resolved in order to rule on the 
creditor’s claim, . . . or the parties have consented to final adjudication by a Bankruptcy 
Judge . . . .” In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(citations omitted). In the D.C. Circuit, a bankruptcy judge lifted the final judgment that it entered 
on a forbearance agreement because, in light of Stern, it did not have constitutional authority to 
enter a final judgment on a defendant’s counterclaim. Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon & 
Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 148, 154 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011). The 
court reasoned that “in the interest of justice and out of deference for the doctrine of separation of 
powers, [it would] lift final judgment, and . . . transfer the Counterclaims to a court with the 
constitutional authority to hear them.” Id. 
 8. For example, a district court in the Third Circuit cited Stern to emphasize the importance 
of separation of powers. Hollander v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., No. 10-793, 2011 WL 2787151, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2011). In the Eleventh Circuit, a district court described the tension between 
core and non-core proceedings in light of Stern. Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony 
Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n (In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n), 456 B.R. 545, 551 n.3 
(M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 9. For example the Third Circuit cited the dissent in Stern to support the proposition that 
the circuit court reviews the bankruptcy court’s “factual findings for clear error.” In re Taylor, 
655 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2011). The Fifth Circuit explained that the case before the court had 
been briefed and argued before the Court issued the Stern decision. The court held that, on 
remand, the district court was to “determine in the first instance whether Stern has applicability to 
further proceedings in th[e] matter.” Sigillito v. Hollander (In re Hollander), 438 F. App’x. 274, 
278 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 10. For example, a California state court of appeal cited Stern to support its assertion that the 
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of California law should not be given the same deference that a 
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the case.11 But long before the bankruptcy world was thrown into a 
frenzy by the Court’s decision, the case began as a love story. 
On June 27, 1994,12 Vickie Lynn Marshall (“Vickie”), a twenty-
six-year-old woman, married J. Howard Marshall II (“Howard”), an 
eighty-nine-year-old man.13 Vickie was known to the public as Anna 
Nicole Smith,14 a Playboy Playmate with a career in acting and 
modeling.15 She appeared in numerous magazines, including as the 
cover model of Playboy magazine in March 1992 and as the 
centerfold Playmate of the Month in May 1992, and appeared on 
television as a Guess Jeans model.16 Howard was said to be one of 
the richest people in Texas,17 having made his fortune in the oil 
business.18 This love story was short lived, however, because 
Howard died in 1995, soon after he and Vickie were married.19 
Unbeknownst to the players in this tale, this marriage would result in 
 
district court’s interpretation of the law should be given. Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 819 n.2 (Ct. App. 2011). A dissenting justice on the Ohio Supreme Court cited 
Stern to support his opinion that tortious interference with a contract and abuse of process claims 
before the state court, in which neither party in the tort claims “is the bankruptcy debtor and in 
which resolution of the litigation will not affect the bankruptcy estate,” are not preempted by the 
federal bankruptcy law. PNH, Inc. v. Alfa Laval Flow, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 120, 128 (Ohio 2011) 
(Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 
 11. See, e.g., Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 649 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 
2011) (explaining that Stern “suggests that resolving the conflict may be a bit more complicated 
than the case law presently admits. Because collateral estoppel—issue preclusion—blocks this 
new suit in its entirety, [the court] affirm[s] on this narrower ground of decision and leave the 
resolution of the conflict for a future case in which it will actually matter”); In re Safety Harbor 
Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Supreme Court merely held [in 
Stern] that Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution in one isolated instance by 
granting bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final judgments on counterclaims that are not 
necessarily resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim. Nothing in Stern limits 
a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over other ‘core’ proceedings.”). 
 12. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 561 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), 
adopted as modified by 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 13. Id. at 554. Vickie was Howard’s third wife. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 14. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 15. In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 554. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 18. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Anna Nicole Smith Case, L.A. TIMES, 
June 24, 2011, at AA2 (describing Howard as an “oil tycoon”). 
 19. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. Howard died on August 4, 1995, of heart failure. Marshall 
v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), 
rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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the sensationalization of their romance,20 more than a decade of 
litigation,21 and aftershocks that the bankruptcy courts will likely feel 
for decades to come.22 
In 1995, prior to Howard’s death, Vickie filed suit in Texas state 
probate court (the “Probate Court”) and asserted that E. Pierce 
Marshall (“Pierce”), Howard’s son,23 “fraudulently induced 
J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not include her, even though 
[Howard] meant to give her half his property.”24 The Probate Court 
found that Howard’s 1982 trust, as amended, and his last will and 
testament were valid and had not been fraudulently forged or 
altered.25 The Probate Court also found that Howard had not agreed 
to give Vickie half of his estate, nor did he intend to give Vickie a 
gift from his 1982 trust or a bequest in his will.26 
Howard passed away on August 4, 1995,27 and Vickie was not 
included in his will.28 On January 25, 1996, Vickie filed for 
bankruptcy.29 Pierce filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, claiming that Vickie defamed him because her lawyers 
told the press that Pierce fraudulently gained control of his father’s 
assets.30 Vickie answered by asserting truth as a defense and 
subsequently filed a counterclaim alleging that Pierce tortiously 
interfered with the gift that she was expecting from Howard.31 The 
 
 20. See, e.g., From the Archives: Anna Nicole Smith Weds J. Howard Marshall II (1994), 
PEOPLE.COM (Feb. 9, 2007, 3:30 PM), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,1536410_2001 
1436,00.html (describing Vickie’s marriage to Howard). This article was originally published on 
August 1, 1994. Id. 
 21. Before Howard’s death, Vickie filed her suit against Pierce in Texas state probate court. 
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. The Supreme Court rendered its final decision in 2011. Id. at 2594. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 23. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. Pierce was the ultimate beneficiary of Howard’s will. 
Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300. 
 24. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 25. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 
U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 553 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), 
adopted as modified by 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), 
rev’d, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 28. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (citing In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 9). 
 31. Id. at 301 (citing In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 9). 
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U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California (the 
“Bankruptcy Court”) granted summary judgment for Vickie on 
Pierce’s defamation claim32 and awarded Vickie “$449,754,134, less 
whatever she receives from the probate of [Howard’s] estate.”33 Her 
total award included more than $400,000,000 in compensatory 
damages and $25,000,000 in punitive damages.34 The award 
triggered a lengthy legal dispute between Vickie and Pierce35 that 
would eventually come before state and federal courts in Louisiana, 
Texas, and California.36 
Then on June 20, 2006, Pierce died,37 followed by Vickie’s 
untimely death on February 8, 2007,38 from a drug overdose.39 
Despite the parties’ deaths, the executor of each respective estate 
continued the litigation, ultimately resulting in the case coming 
before the U.S. Supreme Court.40 It was the second time that the 
dispute between the parties had reached the Court.41 By then, the 
media had already sensationalized the case,42 and numerous blog 
posts43 and legal articles44 were written on the proceedings. 
 
 32. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 616 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001); In re 
Marshall, 253 B.R. at 556 n.16. 
 33. In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 553. 
 34. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011). 
 35. In his opinion, Justice Roberts states that “the history of this litigation is complicated.” 
Id. at 2600. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Zeke Minaya, Texas Oilman E. Pierce Marshall, 67, Dies, HOUS. CHRON. (June 23, 
2006, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Texas-oilman-E-Pierce-Marshall-
67-dies-1885586.php. 
 38. Howard Breuer et al., Anna Nicole Smith Dead, PEOPLE.COM (Feb. 8, 2007, 3:35 PM 
EST), http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,1536410_20011223,00.html. 
 39. Linda Deutsch, Inside Anna Nicole Smith’s Death Room: Duffel of Cash, Bottles of 
Drugs & More, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/08/05/inside-anna-nicole-smiths_n_672336.html (explaining that Vickie was found dead in 
her hotel room in Florida). 
 40. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 n.1. 
 41. Id. at 2600 (“[T]his is the second time [the Court has] had the occasion to weigh in on 
this long-running dispute over . . . the fortune of J. Howard Marshall.”). 
 42. See, e.g., ANDREW GOTTFRIED, supra note 5 (explaining that the Stern decision will 
likely result in future litigation over the issue of bankruptcy judges’ power and may limit their 
right to enter final judgments on certain issues); Savage, supra note 18 (recounting the history of 
Vickie and Howard’s relationship and the lengthy litigation between Vickie and Pierce); see also 
Anna Nicole Smith’s Estate Loses $300 Million Court Fight, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 19, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-19/justice/anna.nicole.estate_1_texas-probate-court-vickie-lynn-
marshall-pierce-marshall?_s=PM:CRIME (explaining that the court of appeals dismissed the 
$474 million judgment that the bankruptcy court awarded to Vickie); Irin Carmon, Ruling Against 
Anna Nicole Smith’s Heirs, Chief Justice Quotes Dickens, JEZEBEL (June 23, 2011, 4:35 PM), 
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Chief Justice Roberts opened his majority opinion by describing 
the case in the words of Charles Dickens: 
This “suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, 
that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it for five 
minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the 
premises. Innumerable children have been born into the 
cause: innumerable young people have married into it;” 
and, sadly, the original parties “have died out of it.” A “long 
procession of [judges] has come in and gone out” during 
that time, and still the suit “drags its weary length before the 
Court.”45 
The divided Court in Stern held that “[t]he Bankruptcy Court 
below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on 
a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling 
on a creditor’s proof of claim.”46 
This Comment addresses the Court’s decision on the jurisdiction 
of the federal bankruptcy courts and the earthquake that this decision 
caused in the federal courts and in the bankruptcy community. Part II 
briefly summarizes bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the relevant 
code and case law. Part III explains Stern’s convoluted procedural 
background, including the cases before the Bankruptcy Court, 
Probate Court, U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California (the “District Court”), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, and Supreme Court. It also addresses the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning regarding the two issues in the case: “(1) whether the 
Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. 
 
http://jezebel.com/5814941/ruling-against-anna-nicole-smiths-heirs-chief-justice-quotes-dickens 
(“The Supreme Court ruled against Anna Nicole Smith, posthumously, in a case that concerned 
the jurisdictions of the various courts entangled in the dispute over J. Howard Marshall's $1.6 
billion estate.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Anna Nicole Smith and Charles Dickens . . . and the Supreme Court, 
CAFFEINATED POL. (June 24, 2011), http://dekerivers.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/anna-nicole-
smith-and-charles-dickens-and-the-supreme-court/ (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s use of a 
Charles Dickens quote in the opinion and the Court’s ultimate holding); Peter Lattman, Law Blog 
Obit: Anna Nicole’s Arch-Nemesis, E. Pierce Marshall, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 26, 2006, 8:39 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/06/26/law-blog-obituary-anna-nicoles-arch-nemesis-e-
pierce-marshall/ (discussing the Court’s holding in 2006 regarding Vickie and Pierce’s dispute). 
 44. See, e.g., ANDREW GOTTFRIED, supra note 5. 
 45. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 (alteration in original) (citing CHARLES DICKENS, Bleak House, 
in WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 1, 4–5 (1891)). 
 46. Id. at 2620. 
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§ 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim; and (2) 
if so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy Court is 
constitutional.”47 Part IV analyzes the effects of the Court’s ruling on 
current jurisprudence and the practical effect that this decision has 
had, and will have, on bankruptcy courts and federal district courts. It 
begins by addressing the short-term remedies to the problems that 
Stern has created within the bankruptcy community and addresses 
the unanticipated long-term consequences of Stern and the 
politicization of the federal judiciary. 
II.  THE LEGAL  
BACKDROP 
Title 11 is the portion of the United States Code that specifically 
governs bankruptcy. Bankruptcy court jurisdiction is formally vested 
in the district courts that have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of 
all cases under title 11.”48 Congress has divided bankruptcy 
proceedings into three categories: (1) “cases under title 11”; (2) core 
“proceedings arising under title 11”; and (3) cases “related to a case 
under title 11.”49 District courts may refer such proceedings to the 
bankruptcy judges in their districts.50 Bankruptcy judges have 
jurisdiction to hear and enter final judgments in “all core proceedings 
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.”51 A final 
judgment is binding on the parties52 and subject to review only if a 
party chooses to appeal.53 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) 
enumerates sixteen examples of core proceedings, though it explains 
that core proceedings are not limited to those that are enumerated in 
the code.54 The enumerated core proceedings include “counterclaims 
by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.”55 The 
 
 47. Id. at 2600. 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006). 
 49. Id. § 157(a). 
 50. Id. This is “how the Bankruptcy Court in this case came to preside over Vickie’s 
bankruptcy proceedings.” Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). 
 52. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85–86 (1982) (plurality 
opinion). 
 53. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2603–04. 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). 
 55. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C). 
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bankruptcy judge makes the determination whether a proceeding is 
considered to be a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2).56 
In Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordburg,57 the Court held that, as a 
statutory matter, a proceeding’s “core” status authorizes bankruptcy 
judges to enter final judgment in the proceeding.58 If a bankruptcy 
judge determines that a proceeding “is not a core proceeding[,] . . . 
the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the district court.”59 The district court then 
hears the case de novo and enters a final judgment.60 The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (the “1978 Act”) provided that bankruptcy 
judges are appointed by the President, serve fourteen-year terms, can 
be removed by the judicial council for misbehavior, and do not have 
fixed salaries.61 The 1978 Act gave bankruptcy courts jurisdiction 
over “civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related 
to cases under Title 11.”62 
However in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co.,63 the Court held that the jurisdictional provisions of 
the 1978 Act were unconstitutional64 because “Art[icle] III bars 
Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws.”65 
The Court enumerated two principles based on the holdings of 
Crowell v. Benson
66 and United States v. Raddatz67 for determining 
“the extent to which Congress may constitutionally vest traditionally 
judicial functions in non-Art[icle] III officers”68: (1) Congress has 
“substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right 
 
 56. Id. § 157(b)(3). 
 57. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 58. Id. at 50. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. §§ 151–154 (Supp. IV 1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) 
(Supp. IV 1976), declared unconstitutional by N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b). 
 63. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 64. Id. at 56–57. 
 65. Id. at 76. This holding of unconstitutionality did not affect the use of administrative 
agencies as adjuncts, as first upheld in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932). Marathon, 458 
U.S. at 69. 
 66. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 67. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). 
 68. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 80. 
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may be adjudicated” when it “creates a substantive federal right”;69 
and (2) “the functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way 
that ‘the essential attributes’ of judicial power are retained in the 
Art[icle] III court.”70 
In response to Marathon, the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 (the 
“Bankruptcy Code”) provides that bankruptcy judges are to be 
appointed by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district 
is located.71 Currently, bankruptcy is statutorily governed by the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, and 
portions of the United States Code. 
III.  STATEMENT OF  
THE CASE: THE EARTH  
BEGINS TO TREMBLE 
For the first time since Marathon, the Court issued a decision 
that greatly affected bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction.72 In Stern, the 
Court held that, although bankruptcy judges can enter final 
judgments on state-law counterclaims by a debtor against a third-
party claimant, they cannot constitutionally enter these judgments.73 
The Court faced these issues after almost a decade of litigation 
during which the case wound its way through the Probate Court, 
Bankruptcy Court, District Court, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court. 
A.  Procedural History 
In 2000, the Bankruptcy Court issued its multimillion-dollar 
ruling against Pierce.74 In post-trial proceedings, he argued that the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s state-law 
counterclaim because the counterclaim was not a “core proceeding” 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 81. 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006). 
 72. See, e.g., Med. Educ. & Health Servs. Inc. v. Indep. Municipality of Mayaguez (In re 
Med. Educ. & Health Servs. Inc.), 459 B.R. 527, 549 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011) (calling Stern a 
“momentous” constitutional ruling on the bankruptcy courts’ authority). 
 73. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011). 
 74. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 561–62 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(awarding Vickie almost $500 million), adopted as modified by 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
vacated, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th 
Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).75 The Bankruptcy Court entered a 
final judgment on the matter, granting Vickie monetary relief and 
asserting that Vickie’s counterclaim was a “core proceeding”; thus 
the court said that it had “the power to enter judgment” on the 
matter.76 Pierce appealed the Bankruptcy Court judgment to the 
District Court.77 The District Court held that Vickie’s counterclaim 
was not a core proceeding,78 though it ruled that the Bankruptcy 
Court did have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over Vickie’s 
counterclaim.79 It reasoned that, in light of Marathon, it “would be 
unconstitutional to hold that any and all counterclaims are core.”80 
The Bankruptcy Court’s judgment was thus vacated and viewed as 
proposed, rather than as final.81 The District Court awarded Vickie 
compensatory damages of $44,292,767.33 and punitive damages of 
$44,292,767.33.82 
Meanwhile, the Probate Court had already entered a judgment in 
Pierce’s favor after conducting a jury trial.83 The District Court did 
not give that judgment preclusive effect and heard the matter de 
novo.84 The Probate Court and the Bankruptcy Court reached 
contrary decisions on the merits of the case.85 On appeal from the 
District Court, the Ninth Circuit applied the “probate exception to 
federal court jurisdiction,” reversed the District Court’s award, and 
remanded the case, instructing the District Court to issue an “order 
 
 75. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 76. Id. at 2602. 
 77. In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5. 
 78. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 632 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (arguing that 
the court may not categorize a counterclaim as “core” when the claim “is only somewhat related 
to the claim against which it is asserted, and when the unique characteristics and context of the 
counterclaim place it outside of the normal type of set-off or other counterclaims that customarily 
arise”). 
 79. Id. at 633. 
 80. Id. at 630 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 
n.31 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
 81. Id. at 633; Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 82. In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 58. 
 83. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 84. Id. at 2602–03. 
 85. Id. at 2600. 
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directing the bankruptcy court to vacate its judgment against [Pierce] 
individually.”86 
The Supreme Court issued its first decision on the dispute on 
May 1, 2006,87 reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit and 
remanding the case for further proceedings.88 On remand, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for “tortious 
interference with an inter vivos gift [was] not a ‘core proceeding.’”89 
The Ninth Circuit explained that its relevant case law only permits a 
bankruptcy judge to adjudicate a claim that satisfies a two-step 
approach: (1) the claim must fit within Congress’s definition of a 
core proceeding; and (2) the claim must arise under or arise in 
Title 11.90 
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred in not giving 
preclusive effect to the Probate Court’s decision on relevant legal 
and factual findings; the “probate court’s judgment was the earliest 
final judgment entered on matters relevant” to the District Court 
proceeding.91 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that allowing the 
Bankruptcy Court to rule on counterclaims that are factually and 
legally unrelated to the claim that is asserted against the bankruptcy 
estate would be too broad a reading of § 157(b)(2)(C) and contrary to 
Marathon.92 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case.93 
 
 86. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 
U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 87. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 293. 
 88. Id. at 315. 
 89. Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2594 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 1055 (referencing In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 737–41 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 91. Id. at 1064. 
 92. Id. at 1057 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 
(1982) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) is unconstitutional.”)). Marathon held that “Article I 
bankruptcy courts could not constitutionally hear a state law breach of contract claim when the 
debtor was the plaintiff.” Kenneth N. Klee, Emerging Issues: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 EMERGING 
ISSUES 5743, 5743 (2011). In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the Court 
limited the holding in Marathon by stating that it “establishes only that Congress may not vest in 
a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in 
a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject 
only to ordinary appellate review.” 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985). Congress’s restructuring of the 
Bankruptcy Code post-Marathon, to conform with the Court’s suggestion that the 
unconstitutionality of Congress’ broad grant of Article III powers could be remedied simply by 
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The Supreme Court again granted certiorari on September 28, 
2010.94 Because both parties had died during the litigation of the 
case, the parties in the decision were Vickie’s and Pierce’s respective 
estates.95 
B.  Reasoning of the  
U.S. Supreme Court 
In its opinion, the Court addressed two issues: “(1) whether the 
Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim; and (2) 
if so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy Court is 
constitutional.”96 
1.  The Bankruptcy Court’s 
Statutory Authority 
The Court reasoned that under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), 
“Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference [was] 
a ‘core proceeding.’”97 According to Court jurisprudence, a 
bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment on the core matters in a 
proceeding.98 However, the Court explained that “[a]s written, 
§ 157(b)(1) is ambiguous,”99 though the Court read the statute as 
saying that “core proceedings are those that arise in a bankruptcy 
case or under title 11.”100 
 
“providing that ancillary common-law actions . . . be routed to the United States district court of 
which the bankruptcy court is an adjunct,” is commonly referred to as the “Marathon Fix.” See 
Geraldine Mund, A Look Behind the Ruling: The Supreme Court and the Unconstitutionality of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401, 420 (2004) (quoting Marathon, 458 U.S. at 
92). 
 93. In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1065. 
 94. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 63, 63 (2010). 
 95. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 n.1. 
 96. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600. The issue of statutory authority arises because Vickie’s claim 
was an “otherwise non-core tort cause of action asserted as a compulsory counterclaim to a 
creditor’s nondischargability complaint and proof of claim against the debtor.” Klee, supra note 
92, at 1. 
 97. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 98. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 34 (1989) (“[T]he Seventh 
Amendment entitles a person who has not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate to a jury 
trial when sued by the bankruptcy trustee to recover an allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer.”). 
 99. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 100. Id. at 2605. 
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In this case, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the 
Bankruptcy Court, under § 157(b)(2)(C), could enter a final 
judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for tortious 
interference because of Pierce’s consent.101 The Court found that 
Pierce consented to the Bankruptcy Court’s resolution of his 
defamation claim102 because he did not object in any court that 
§ 157(b)(5)103 prohibited the Bankruptcy Court from deciding his 
claim.104 
The Court reasoned that if Pierce objected to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s authority to decide the defamation claim, he should have 
promptly communicated that objection.105 His failure to do so 
forfeited any argument that he did not consent.106 
2.  The Constitutionality of the  
Bankruptcy Court’s Authority 
As to the second issue, the Court held that, although a 
bankruptcy court is statutorily permitted to enter a final judgment on 
a counterclaim,107 allowing the Bankruptcy Court to enter a final 
judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim was unconstitutional under 
Article III of the Constitution.108 The Court addressed the similarities 
between the 1978 Act and the Bankruptcy Code.109 
In Stern, the Court held that a portion of the Bankruptcy Code is 
unconstitutional in that a bankruptcy court lacks the “constitutional 
authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is 
 
 101. Id. at 2606. 
 102. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) provides that parties may consent to a bankruptcy judge’s entry 
of a final judgment in a non-core case. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2006). 
 103. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2606. Section 157(b)(3) states that “[t]he bankruptcy judge shall 
determine, on the judge’s own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a 
core proceeding under this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under 
title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). This imposes an affirmative duty on the bankruptcy judges to 
determine whether the matter is core or not. Heller v. Arnold & Porter (In re Heller), No. 08-
32514DM, Adv. No. 10-3203DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 104. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (explaining the Court’s previous holdings in cases such as 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, where the court “recognized ‘the value of waiver and forfeiture 
rules’ in ‘complex’ cases” (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 n.6, 488 
(2008))). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2611. 
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not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of 
claim.”110 The Court further held that § 157(b)(2)(C) 
“unconstitutionally delegates the judicial power of the United States 
to non-Article III bankruptcy judges” by giving them jurisdiction to 
enter final judgments on common-law counterclaims.111 
Further, the Court noted the distinction between “public rights” 
and “private rights.”112 It reasoned that Vickie’s counterclaim did not 
fall into the public rights exception as the Court had enumerated in 
prior opinions.113 The Court explained that the case “involve[d] the 
most prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final, 
binding judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a 
common law cause of action, when the action neither derive[d] from 
nor depend[ed] upon any agency regulatory regime.”114 
The Court explained that “[i]n ruling on Vickie’s counterclaim, 
the Bankruptcy Court was required to and did make several factual 
and legal determinations.”115 It added that the counterclaim “is in no 
 
 110. Id. at 2620. 
 111. Klee, supra note 92, at 3. 
 112. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612–13 (referring to the distinction made in Crowell, where public 
rights were defined as those arising “between the Government and persons subject to its authority 
in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative 
departments” and private rights were defined as those that are “of the liability of one individual to 
another under the law as defined” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932))). The 
public rights exception was first enumerated in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). Id. at 2611. Subsequent case law extended the public 
rights exception to cases “where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under . . . 
[a] statute creating enforceable rights.” Id. at 2613 (citations omitted). The Court in Marathon 
cited Bakelite to support the proposition that the public rights exception extended “only to matters 
that historically could have been determined exclusively by” the Executive and Legislative 
Branches. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). The Court subsequently 
rejected these prior definitions of public rights that limited the exception only to actions that 
involved the government as a party. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613. It redefined the public rights 
exception as a “right [that] is integrally related to particular federal government action.” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 113. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 114. Id. at 2615. The Court continued that if “such an exercise of judicial power may 
nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some amorphous 
‘public right,’ then Article III would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and 
separation of powers we have long recognized into mere wishful thinking.” Id. 
 115. Id. at 2617. The Court related Vickie’s counterclaim to the fraudulent conveyance action 
in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989), and held that “Congress may not 
bypass Article III simply because a proceeding may have some bearing on a bankruptcy case.” Id. 
at 2618 (emphasis omitted). The question is rather “whether the action at issue stems from the 
bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. 
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way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law; it is a state tort 
action that exists without regard to any bankruptcy proceeding.”116 In 
addition, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Court also had to rule on 
questions of Texas state tort law that had never come before the 
Supreme Court of Texas.117 Further, because Vickie’s counterclaim 
did not fall within the public rights exception, it would have been 
unconstitutional for the Bankruptcy Court to issue a final judgment 
on her claim.118 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of Article III precedent.119 However, he stated that the 
public rights exception only applies to conflicts where at least one 
party is the government.120 
3.  The Dissent: A Finding  
of Constitutionality 
Justice Breyer’s dissent121 argued that the majority 
misinterpreted and misrepresented some Court precedent.122 The 
dissent enumerated five factors that the Court should have 
considered in determining whether the notion of separation of 
powers, inherent in the Constitution, had been violated.123 The 
dissent concluded that “any intrusion on the Judicial Branch” would 
be “de minimis,” and, thus, the Bankruptcy Code is constitutional.124 
 
 116. Id. at 2618. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2620 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan. Id. 
at 2621 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 2622. The dissent argued that the majority should have put less emphasis on 
statements made in Murray’s Lessee and the plurality opinion in Marathon, and that it should 
have applied the Court’s approach in Crowell, Thomas, and Schor. Id. (citing cases). 
 123. Id. at 2625–26. Breyer listed these factors as 
(1) the nature of the claim to be adjudicated; (2) the nature of the non-Article III 
tribunal; (3) the extent to which Article III courts exercise control over the proceeding; 
(4) the presence or absence of the parties’ consent; and (5) the nature and importance 
of the legislative purpose served by the grant of adjudicatory authority to a tribunal 
with judges who lack Article III’s tenure and compensation protections. 
Id. at 2626 (stating, further, that the majority “disregard[ed]” the controlling precedent of 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)). 
 124. Id. at 2629. 
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IV.  THE IMPACT  
OF STERN: PICKING  
UP THE PIECES 
Stern called into question bankruptcy judges’ fitness to “hear 
and determine” cases125 and left unresolved the question of “whether 
the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to resolve 
objections to claims, and, if the bankruptcy courts do have such 
power, whether they” have the constitutional authority to “adjudicate 
state law counterclaims for purposes of defense or offset in 
determining the allowance of claims.”126 The holding in Stern has 
left a gap in the law on how to deal with core proceedings that do not 
“arise under” Title 11 or “in” a Title 11 case.127 No statute directly 
addresses the issue of the nature of the counterclaim that arose in 
Stern.128 Congress may rewrite the statute to “clearly cover [the type 
of] counterclaim” that was involved in Stern “as being a part of a 
non-core matter” as defined in the existing statute;129 however, the 
Court’s decision likely will not result in a dramatic change until and 
unless bankruptcy courts continue to be stripped of their 
“constitutional authority” to enter final judgments in certain 
matters.130 
A.  A Short-Term Fix 
Despite the hype surrounding the decision,131 one possible 
approach to the conundrum that the Stern decision created would be 
 
 125. Interview with Dan Schechter, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch. L.A., in L.A., Cal. 
(Oct. 4, 2011). Dan Schechter teaches bankruptcy, property, and secured transactions at Loyola 
Law School Los Angeles. Id. He has also served as a consultant and given expert testimony in 
numerous bankruptcy cases. Id. 
 126. Klee, supra note 92, at 5. 
 127. Judge Montali has called these proceedings “unconstitutional core.” Heller v. Arnold & 
Porter (In re Heller), No. 08-32514DM, Adv. No. 10-3203DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *3 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 2011). 
 128. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604. 
 129. Interview with the Honorable Alan M. Ahart, supra note 4. 
 130. Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125. 
 131. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2 (stating that “hype is a good 
word” to describe the reaction to Stern within the bankruptcy community); see also Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Citron (In re Citron), No. 08-71442, Adv. No. 09-8125, 2011 WL 4711942, at *1 n.1 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011) (describing the reaction to Stern as noise, and explaining that 
decisions have supported “broad, narrow, and middle-of-the-road interpretations” of Stern); In re 
Heller, 2011 WL 4542512, at *1 (explaining the “flurry of activity” that resulted throughout the 
country after Stern); Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 
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to treat compulsory counterclaims that cannot constitutionally be 
treated as core claims as having “come off the list of core [matters] 
and become non-core,”132 despite the fact that the statute does not 
technically provide for this categorization.133 Thus, a bankruptcy 
judge “would treat the matter as non-core and make proposed 
findings to the district court.”134 
The Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy courts to issue final 
rulings on certain core proceedings.135 For a proceeding that is 
deemed non-core, bankruptcy judges may enter proposed findings in 
the form of reports and recommendations.136 Thereafter, the parties 
have the opportunity for a district court to hear the matter on a de 
novo basis under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).137 If this is not done, the 
parties waive their ability to appeal.138 
If, as the Court has held, bankruptcy courts are not permitted to 
hear counterclaims that do not “[s]tem from the bankruptcy itself,”139 
then the federal district courts would have to hear a counterclaim on 
the merits on a de novo basis, substantially increasing federal district 
 
318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“[B]ombshell does fairly describe Stern’s impact upon the 
more practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what the Code still calls 
[bankruptcy judges] to do.”). 
 132. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 133. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2604 (“Nowhere does § 157 specify what bankruptcy courts are to do 
with respect to the category of matters that Pierce posits—core proceedings that do not arise 
under Title 11 or in a Title 11 case.” (emphasis omitted)); Interview with the Honorable Sheri 
Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 134. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. “In reality, the bankruptcy 
court will ‘hear’ without determining the various controversies that they used to ‘hear and 
determine.’” Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125. Post Stern, “the bankruptcy judges 
will issue ‘reports’” as opposed to final judgments. Id.; see also, Standing Order of Reference Re: 
Title 11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012) (“The district court may treat any order of the bankruptcy court 
as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the event the district court concludes that 
the bankruptcy judge could not have entered a final order or judgment consistent with Article III 
of the United States Constitution.”). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006) (explaining that bankruptcy judges may enter orders and 
judgments on core proceedings). 
 136. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033. 
 137. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). “A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core 
proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” Id. In this non-core proceeding, 
the bankruptcy judge submits “proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law to the district 
court,” which enters a final judgment on the matter after it conducts a de novo review of “those 
matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.” Id. The appeal must be done 
within fourteen days of the entering of the bankruptcy judge’s order. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033. 
 138. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033. 
 139. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011). 
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court judges’ already heavy caseloads.140 In many bankruptcy 
proceedings, one party has a compulsory counterclaim against the 
other and the counterclaim does not fall into one of the three 
categories that § 157(a) designates.141 However, as a practical matter, 
“bankruptcy courts will hear the matter, issue a report and 
recommendation,” and the district court will most likely adhere to 
the recommendation without a full hearing; thus, Stern is unlikely to 
result in a “huge increase in the workload of the district courts.”142 
The Stern decision has the potential to create a “game of 
jurisdictional ping-pong between courts,” leading to “inefficien[cies], 
increased cost, [and] delay . . . [for] those faced with bankruptcy”143 
as the parties “litigate the appropriate forum for the adjudication of 
their dispute.”144 However, these adverse effects would be reduced if 
“bankruptcy judges treat these matters as non-core and make 
proposed findings to the district court.”145 
Another issue that Stern left unresolved is the extent to which 
the problem may be remedied by consent. Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(2), parties may consent to a bankruptcy judges’ entry of 
final judgments in non-core cases.146 This leaves the decision of 
 
 140. Id. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. See id. (referencing Bankr. Servs., Inc. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 
F.3d 432 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2008); In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 348 B.R. 234 (Bankr. Del. 2005); In 
re Ascher, 128 B. R. 639 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Sun W. Distribs., Inc., 69 B.R. 861 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987)). 
 142. Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125. For example, in the Sixth Circuit, a 
district court judge adopted the bankruptcy court judge’s recommendation in the case. Reed v. 
Johnson, No. 1:11-cv-884, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107517, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2011). 
The bankruptcy judge issued the recommendation to the district court under the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 9033(a) after “the Bankruptcy Judge concluded he lacked jurisdiction to 
enter a final order.” Id. However, where a bankruptcy judge issued a final judgment on a 
dismissal of claims, a district court in the Second Circuit, in light of Stern, converted the 
judgment to a recommendation. Retired Partners of Coudert Bros. Trust v. Baker & McKenzie 
LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11-2785 (CM), Adv. No. 08-1472, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110425, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011). 
 143. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 144. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 145. Id.; see Interview with the Honorable Alan M. Ahart, supra note 4 (explaining that when 
he renders an opinion on a matter that raises a Stern problem, he will state in the opinion that he 
is making “findings of fact or conclusions of law,” and if it is found that he does not have 
constitutional authority to handle the particular matter, then the decision should be treated as “a 
recommendation for purposes of the district court to hear the matter on a de novo basis”). 
 146. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2006). Rule 7012(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure states that in an adversary proceeding, 
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where certain matters are adjudicated up to the parties in the 
adversary proceeding.147 If consent does not solve the problem that 
Stern presented, however, the “entire underpinning of the ‘Marathon 
fix’ does not work, and bankruptcy judges will not be able to hear 
any non-core cases.”148 
Thus, bankruptcy judges are left to operate in something of a 
black hole, not knowing exactly where these Stern-type 
counterclaims fall statutorily or how and when to issue final 
orders.149 In order to continue functioning as a judicial institution, 
bankruptcy courts must continue to hear these matters and issue 
decisions unless Congress changes the statute or the Supreme Court 
decides otherwise.150 Bankruptcy judges must “continue to believe 
that all [Stern] does is move ‘it’ from core to non-core.”151 What “it” 
is composed of “will be subject to some litigation” in order to 
determine how broadly Stern reaches.152 If bankruptcy courts do not 
move the “it” from the list of core matters to the list of non-core 
matters, the entire bankruptcy system will not work, and bankruptcy 
judges will be left “staring down the abyss.”153 Although Stern 
caused an earthquake within the bankruptcy courts, as a practical 
matter, the decision’s most significant short-term impact may merely 
be an increase in the number of “motions to dismiss,” “motions to 
 
[a] responsive pleading shall admit or deny an allegation that the proceeding is core or 
non-core. If the response is that the proceeding is non-core, it shall include a statement 
that the party does or does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the 
bankruptcy judge. In non-core proceedings final orders and judgments shall not be 
entered on the bankruptcy judge’s order except with the express consent of the parties. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b). 
 147. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 323 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (enumerating Judge Hughes’s frustration that Stern “offers virtually no 
insight as to how to recalibrate the core/non-core dichotomy so that [he] can again proceed with 
at least some assurance that [he] will not be making the same constitutional blunder with respect 
to some other aspect of Authority Section 157(b)(2)”). 
 150. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 151. Id.; see also Heller v. Arnold & Porter (In re Heller), No. 08-32514DM, Adv. No. 10-
3203DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011) (explaining that bankruptcy 
judges have the power to “handle all pre-trial matters and motions” in non-core cases and, should 
a case be determined unconstitutional but core, it should be treated as non-core). In non-core 
cases, the district court should treat the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact as “proposed” 
findings. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 152. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 153. Id. 
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abstain” from hearing a matter, or “motions to withdraw the 
reference” filed with regard to certain bankruptcy matters.154 
However, if the Court continues down the road on which it has 
been traveling, it may later hold that bankruptcy judges no longer 
have the power to enter final judgments on fraudulent transfer155 and 
preference avoidance litigation.156 These two actions are frequently 
filed in a bankruptcy case157 and are two of the “fundamental policies 
underlying the [bankruptcy] code.”158 
Similarly, if lower courts construe Stern broadly to mean that 
bankruptcy judges do not have the constitutional power to enter final 
judgments in preference and fraudulent transfer actions, bankruptcy 
courts’ ability to adjudicate two of the most frequently filed 
adversary proceedings will be significantly affected.159 If bankruptcy 
 
 154. Both Judge Ahart and Judge Bluebond explain that more motions to withdraw the 
reference will likely be filed in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Interview with the 
Honorable Alan M. Ahart, supra note 4; Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra 
note 2. For example, in a bankruptcy court in the Eighth Circuit, the defendant timely brought a 
motion for relief from a judgment entered by the bankruptcy court pursuant to the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023. Badami v. Sears Cattle Co. (In re AFY, Inc.), No. BK10-40875-
TLS, Adv. No. A10-4062-TLS, 2011 WL 3800041, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Aug. 18, 2011). The 
court granted the defendant’s relief from judgment, and recommended to the “District Court for 
the District of Nebraska that it withdraw the reference of [the] adversary proceeding to enter a 
final judgment on the plaintiff’s” claim for collection of an account receivable and consider the 
bankruptcy court’s previous order on the matter as “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.” Id. at *3. 
 155. “Fraudulent transfer law is one of the oldest forms of legal creditor protection, tracing its 
roots to the ancient Statute of Elizabeth, enacted in 1571.” GREENBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD 
PLLC, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in Pain, in THE 
AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2008/2009, at 107 (2008/2009), available 
at http://www.americasrestructuring.com/08_SF/p107-115%20Preferences%20and%20fraudulent 
%20transfers.pdf. Fraudulent transfers are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 548. 
GREENBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD PLLC, supra, at 107. 
 156. See, e.g., ANDREW GOTTFRIED, supra note 5 (explaining that Stern could be extended to 
remove bankruptcy courts’ power to enter final judgments in “fraudulent transfer and preference 
avoidance litigation,” resulting in “most of the avoidance actions [transferring] from the 
bankruptcy courts to the district courts”); Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra 
note 2 (explaining that depending on how broadly Stern is interpreted, bankruptcy courts’ 
authority to hear preference and fraudulent transfer actions may be called into question as well). 
 157. ANDREW GOTTFRIED, supra note 5 (describing the volume of fraudulent transfer and 
preference avoidance litigation). 
 158. GREENBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD PLLC, supra note 155 (referencing Cent. Va. Cmty. 
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2005)). 
 159. See Heller v. Arnold & Porter (In re Heller), No. 08-32514DM, Adv. No. 10-3203DM, 
2011 WL 4542512, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 2011). Judge Montali issued a 
recommendation sua sponte regarding motions to withdraw the reference with relation to a 
fraudulent transfer proceeding before him. Id. He argued that if the district court allowed the 
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judges are not able to render final judgments in two of the most 
common claims, district courts will have to hear and issue final 
judgments in such matters. Having district court judges hear these 
matters is problematic for two reasons: (1) the district courts already 
have overcrowded dockets;160 and (2) many times district courts lack 
the necessary familiarity with the Bankruptcy Code.161 
B.  Long-Term  
Consequences of Stern 
The Supreme Court itself stated that the decision would “not 
change all that much”162 and that the question presented in Stern is a 
“narrow” one.163 Some courts have followed this narrow 
interpretation of bankruptcy judges’ power.164 However, despite the 
Court’s specific language about its narrow holding, other bankruptcy 
courts have interpreted Stern broadly and declined to enter a final 
judgment on actions not explicitly enumerated as unconstitutional in 
Stern.165 
 
withdrawal of the reference, it “would amount to an unnecessary extension of the narrow holding 
in Stern, [and] would be an inefficient use of judicial resources by overburdening the district 
court and foregoing the services of a bankruptcy court ready, willing and able to do its job.” Id.; 
Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2 (explaining that the “logical 
consequences” flowing from the reasoning of the Court in Stern have the potential to be “pretty 
horrific”); see also Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Nos. 11-193, -194, -196, -197, 2011 WL 
4403289, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2011) (explaining that Stern does not require withdrawal of 
the reference in preference and fraudulent transfer actions). 
 160. In 2010, bankruptcy courts had almost 1.6 million filings. The district courts had a 
docket of around 280,000 civil cases and 78,000 criminal cases. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 
2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 161. See Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125 (explaining that bankruptcy is a 
specialized and difficult area where federal law and intricate state law intersect). 
 162. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 163. Id. at 2613. 
 164. See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 719 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2011) (“[T]his Court agrees with the Stern Court that the decision in Stern ‘does not change all 
that much.’” (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620)). 
 165. See, e.g., Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 
320 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (concluding that the bankruptcy court did not have the authority to 
enter a final judgment in a multimillion-dollar fraudulent transfer claim). The Ninth Circuit 
invited amicus curiae to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether Stern prohibited 
“bankruptcy courts from entering a final, binding judgment on an action to avoid a fraudulent 
conveyance” and, if so, whether a bankruptcy court may “hear the proceeding and submit a report 
and recommendation to a federal district court in lieu of entering a final judgment.” Exec. 
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 661 F.3d 476, 476 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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Courts have extended Stern beyond the bankruptcy courts to 
question the authority of magistrate judges. For example, the Fifth 
Circuit sua sponte directed parties to brief the issue of 
whether the reasoning in Stern applies to magistrate judges, 
which, like bankruptcy judges, are not Article III judges[,] 
and whether, under Stern, a magistrate judge can enter final 
judgment in a case tried to a magistrate judge by consent 
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) where jurisdiction is based on 
diversity of citizenship and state law provides the rule of 
decision.166 
It is unlikely that the Court anticipated that the constitutionality of 
magistrate judges’ ability to enter final judgments on certain matters 
would be called into question because of its holding in Stern.167 
Additionally, a broad interpretation of Stern could affect the 
authority of other Article I courts. One such Article I court is the 
U.S. Tax Court (the “Tax Court”).168 Theoretically, the Tax Court 
could fall within the public rights exception169 because it adjudicates 
disputes between the government and taxpayers as private citizens;170 
thus, the Tax Court may continue to issue binding decisions.171 
However, if Stern is construed broadly to mean that bankruptcy 
judges’ status as Article I judges per se renders them unable to 
constitutionally issue final decisions, this reasoning could be 
 
 166. Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 10-20640, at *2 
(5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011) (requesting that the parties submit briefs to the magistrate judges). 
 167. See Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125 (“The minority did a much better job 
[of considering the consequences of the Stern decision] than the majority did. . . . It seemed that 
the majority was simply mechanically applying the language of the statute and mechanically 
applying its view of Article III, rather than considering the role of the bankruptcy courts within 
the federal system.”); Interview with the Honorable Alan M. Ahart, supra note 4 (explaining that 
“there is no indication in the majority opinion that the Stern court” considered the impact that the 
decision would have on magistrate judges). 
 168. I.R.C. § 7441 (2006). The Tax Court is composed of nineteen judges, id. § 7443(a), who 
are “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” id. § 7443(b), 
and who serve fifteen-year terms, id. § 7443(e). 
 169. See supra note 112. 
 170. See About the Court, UNITED STATES TAX COURT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
(May 25, 2011) (“When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has determined a tax deficiency, 
the taxpayer may dispute the deficiency in the Tax Court before paying any disputed amount.”). 
 171. See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Tax Court and its ability to exercise “judicial power”). 
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extended to the Tax Court. In sum, Stern has caused aftershocks172 
that have reached further than the Court likely considered.173 
C.  Politicization of 
 the Judiciary 
One way to subdue these aftershocks is to make bankruptcy 
judges Article III judges, which would vest them with the same 
constitutional authority that district court judges have and the 
corresponding ability to enter final judgments in both core and non-
core matters. Unlike bankruptcy judges, Article III judges enjoy 
tenure during good behavior and salary protection.174 The Court has 
expressed that central to our government is the concept of separation 
of powers within the tripartite government, where each branch has 
constitutionally enumerated powers.175 Article III, Section 1, of the 
Constitution states that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”176 The 
Court has confirmed that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial 
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit 
at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”177 
Bankruptcy judges are currently appointed by the circuit 
courts178 in an apolitical, merit-based screening process.179 District 
 
 172. “The case already has caused enormous confusion in the federal courts.” Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Enormous Confusion, NAT’L LAW JOURNAL (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.law.com 
/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202512531253&slreturn=1. 
 173. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
power “in one isolated respect,” but failing to address the broader implications of this excess of 
power). 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (discussing federal courts’ 
powers and the concept of separation of powers); see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2365 (2011) (discussing the importance that separation of powers has in the protection of “each 
branch of government from incursion by the others”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (the Framers considered separation of powers 
an integral part of the Constitution, and “the judiciary [must] remain[] truly distinct from both the 
legislature and the executive”). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 177. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). 
 178. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
district is located. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006). 
 179. Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2; see also NINTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT, INFORMATION AND APPLICATION MATERIALS FOR APPLICANTS TO A FOURTEEN-YEAR 
TERM AS UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE, at ii (2011), available at http://www.caeb.us 
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court judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.180 The process is inherently intertwined with the two political 
branches of the government—the executive and legislative branches. 
If bankruptcy judges were required to be confirmed by the Senate, 
the appointment process would become more politicized and less 
efficient.181 A bankruptcy judge’s office “is really not a partisan 
office and the issue[s within bankruptcy] cut so many ways” that you 
can appoint someone from one political party or another “and not be 
sure that means they are going to be pro creditor or pro debtor.”182 It 
seems unlikely, “however, that, in the current political climate, 
legislation to create a few hundred additional Article III judgeships 
would ever be adopted absent any other viable alternative for 
resolving a jurisdictional crisis in the bankruptcy arena.”183 
Thus, it is unlikely that bankruptcy judges will become 
Article III judges any time in the near future.184 An “absolute crisis 
in the federal judiciary” will have to arise before bankruptcy judges 
will become Article III judges.185 A general notion exists within the 
federal judiciary that “many members of the Article III judiciary are 
protective of their status and would not be supportive of a general 
expansion of the Article III status of the bankruptcy judges.”186 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In an effort to maintain the system of checks and balances that 
are enshrined in the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Stern held a 
 
courts.gov/documents/Employment/BJApplication-2011.pdf (explaining that the Ninth Circuit 
uses an open-selection merit process in appointing bankruptcy judges.) 
 180. Federal Judges Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2011). 
 181. “Currently, at least in California, when there is an opening [on the bankruptcy bench] or 
even in advance of when there is going to be an opening, in order to have there be no gap in 
coverage,” the Ninth Circuit appoints somebody through a “merit screening process and politics 
does not enter into it, nor should it.” Interview with the Honorable Sheri Bluebond, supra note 2. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.; see also Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125 (explaining that, given the 
“present political climate,” it is unlikely that bankruptcy courts will be made Article III courts). 
 184. Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125; Interview with the Honorable Alan M. 
Ahart, supra note 4. 
 185. Interview with Dan Schechter, supra note 125. 
 186. Id. 
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portion of the Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional.187 The Court 
arguably preserved the sanctity of the “judicial power” by preventing 
“other branches of the Federal Government” from “confer[ring] the 
Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.”188 In 
this effort to protect the “integrity of judicial decisionmaking,”189 the 
Court created an earthquake within the bankruptcy system that called 
into question the sanctity of bankruptcy courts and their ability to 
enter decisions on matters that they have been hearing for centuries. 
While bankruptcy judges have created ways to temporarily address 
the conundrum that Stern created, potential long-term effects of the 
ruling could be devastating to the way that bankruptcy courts 
currently operate. It may take years or perhaps decades to fully 
comprehend Stern’s impact on the federal judiciary. This tale that 
began as a love story has caused aftershocks throughout the 
bankruptcy community and entire federal judiciary—tremors that 









 187. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“The Bankruptcy Court below lacked 
the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not 
resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”). 
 188. See id. at 2609 (“Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and 
balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal 
Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.”). 
 189. Id. at 2597. 
